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ABSTRACT: This paper outlines some of the implications of counterterrorist
legislation, including Prevent, for the pedagogical relationship and for
educational institutions. The concept of ‘radicalisation’, central to the
Prevent Strategy, is one that is contested in the field of counterterrorism,
yet educators are now expected to identify and refer students ‘at risk of
radicalisation’. Such students are described as vulnerable throughout the
policy documentation; however, the way in which vulnerability is concep-
tualised is resonant with colonial discourses of contagion and immunity, and
it risks silencing and even pathologising the person labelled vulnerable.
Prevent does not clearly define central concepts such as extremism, radica-
lisation, vulnerability, and this may make both students and staff fearful
speaking freely in classrooms and lecture halls. Based on the experience of
teaching IRA and INLA prisoners in the Republic of Ireland, the author
outlines a set of philosophical and ethical principles that ought to underpin
education. It is argued that education must not be subordinated to security
and intelligence agendas on pragmatic, educational and ethical grounds.
Keywords: counterterrorism, CONTEST, education, prevent, dialogue, trust,
vulnerability, prison
1. INTRODUCTION
This essay examines some of the implications of the Prevent legislation in the
UK that has made it a statutory duty for a range of institutions and organisations,
including educational institutions, to prevent terrorism. It also examines the
implications of other elements of counterterrorism legislation for educators.
Whilst many organisations had previously engaged with Prevent on a voluntary
basis, this new legislation, setting duties on a statutory footing, has significant
implications for curricula, freedom of speech, critical enquiry, the pedagogical
relationship, the educational experience, and for the integrity of students, tea-
chers and lecturers. Whilst I believe that educators have a duty to respond to, and
inform the appropriate authorities about specific risks of violence, including
violent extremism and terrorism, Prevent-related policy documentation appears
to make unwarranted connections between ill-defined concepts of extremism,
violent extremism and radicalisation. Despite critiques of the concept of ‘radi-
calisation’ by Kundnani (2009, 2012, 2014, 2015) and Horgan (2005, 2008a,
2008b), amongst others, Prevent appears to imply that: (i) there are linear causal
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pathways of ‘radicalisation’ and clear observable indicators which can signal
who is at ‘risk of radicalisation’; (ii) there is a clear causal relationship between
the existence of extremist or even radical belief systems and terrorist or violent
actions; and (iii) one can be ‘vulnerable’ to and indeed ‘infected’ by ideas. The
concept of ‘vulnerability’ is used in this context to suggest that the ‘vulnerable’
person may either already be, or risks becoming, an extremist, violent extremist
or a terrorist (HM Government, 2008, 2009, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2014, 2015b;
House of Commons, 2010).
A clear set of philosophical and ethical principles ought to underpin educa-
tion, including in prisons, in order to preserve its autonomy from security and
intelligence agendas. There are real risks in failing to do so. I draw from my
experience of teaching philosophy to people arrested and tried under the
Offences against the State Acts1 who were imprisoned in Portlaoise Prison, a
high-security prison in the Republic of Ireland, and from a Legacy Review called
‘Unfamiliar Voices’ (2013) that documented the National College of Art and
Design’s (NCAD’s) Art in Prison programme in Portlaoise Prison, a programme
that extended over 26 years from the mid-eighties.2 Making Prevent a statutory
duty risks damaging relations of trust and openness in institutions by silencing
and marginalising students and staff who might otherwise wish to engage in the
exploration of difficult questions and ideas. Such a breakdown of trust can lead
to alienation, disaffection and disengagement. Even if the closed mind of the
extremist is a significant obstacle to the pedagogical endeavour, it is not an
insurmountable one, and the fact is that extremists of many varieties exist.
Insistence that any extremist, whilst in the classroom, respect the principles
and rules of the educational space is perhaps a wiser, more subtle strategy than
a direct intervention by an educator to challenge a student’s extremist ideology,
as appears to be suggested by Prevent, in particular if only certain kinds of
extremist beliefs are to be tackled under the aegis of counterterrorism. This
would be an approach more cognisant of the limits of education but also of its
possibilities, inviting students to think and to reflect. Education ought to be, by
its nature and in its practice, anti-extremist. Good educational practices develop
the ability to question and critically evaluate, the capacity to offer arguments and/
or evidence, the desire to understand, the capacity to listen to others and to reflect
on one’s own position, and they invite a sense of one’s fallibility and the idea that
learning is a continuing process. It is an error and potentially counterproductive
to argue for the cultivation of such qualities and capacities in terms of their
instrumental value as part of a counterterrorist strategy.
2. ‘RADICALISATION’ AND THE STATUTORY DUTIES ACCOMPANYING
PREVENT
Prevent is part of the UK’s broader Counter Terrorist Strategy (CONTEST). It
concerns itself with radicalisation in the context of counterterrorism and
targets all forms of terrorism and extremism, both violent and non-violent.
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Particular emphasis is placed on ‘Islamist terrorism’, but the strategy also
targets Irish and Northern Irish Republican paramilitary organisations and the
white supremacist ideology of extreme far right groups. CONTEST includes
three other strands: Prepare, Protect and Pursue. Prevent Duty Guidance for
England and Wales and for Scotland both state that ‘Section 26 of the
Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (the Act) places a duty on certain
bodies, listed in Schedule 6 to the Act, to have, in the exercise of their
functions, “due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into
terrorism”’. The documentation states that, ‘[t]he Government has defined
extremism in the Prevent strategy as vocal or active opposition to fundamental
British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and
mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in
our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed
forces’ (HM Government, 2015a, p. 2). It explains that that the Prevent
strategy was changed to deal with ‘all forms of terrorism and with non-violent
extremism which can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can
popularize views which terrorists then exploit’ (HM Government, 2011c, p. 3;
my italics). Radicalisation is here described ‘as the process by which a person
comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism’
(2011c, p. 3). The guidance and the legislation imply that there is a causal
and legible process that proceeds from an encounter with ideas to acts of
violence. This is an empty definition of radicalisation which mobilises tauto-
logical and formal reasoning. It fails to explain what radicalisation is, what it
means or even how it works.
Some definitions of radicalisation, such as that of the European Commission
which focuses on ideology, describe radicalisation as ‘[t]he phenomenon of
people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terror-
ism’ (Schmid, 2013, p. 12). Although the concept of radicalisation has become a
popular political shibboleth since the Madrid (2004) and London (2005) bomb-
ings (Schmid, 2013, p. iii), ‘[a]n exploration of the literature also confirms the
pitfalls of profiling those individuals “likely” to become terrorists. The current
propensity to focus on “vulnerable” young people in the search for causes of
terrorism has produced inconclusive results’ (2013, pp. iii–iv). Someone may be
an extremist but this does not mean that he or she will be violent. Someone may
be a terrorist, but not an extremist or even radical (Bartlett and Birdwell, 2010;
Horgan, 2005; Horgan and Taylor, 2011). As Coolsaet notes, ‘[r]ight from its
inception, the notion of “radicalisation” itself was a source of ambiguity and
confusion’ and he claims that ‘[m]any different expressions of an individual’s
ideas and behaviour were being labelled as signs of radicalisation, and these
ranged from the increased presence of girls and women wearing the hijab, men
dressed in Salafi trousers, orthodox preachers and the terrorists themselves.
Putting these disparate signs together into a box labelled “indicators of radica-
lisation” emptied the word of all explanatory meaning, turning it into a container
concept’ (2015, p. 5). It was, he says, the simplicity and ambiguity of
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‘radicalisation’ that made it an attractive concept. Indeed, even in the case of
members of terrorist organisations who have disengaged, there is little evidence
that disengagement results in or requires de-radicalisation (Horgan, 2008a,
2008b; Horgan and Bjørgo, 2009).
Yet, despite the considerable critical literature in the field of counterterrorism
studies, institutions, authorities and bodies in the UK now have a statutory duty
to demonstrate that they are aware of and understand the risk of radicalisation,
and their staff must know both ‘what radicalisation means and why people may
be vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism as a consequence of it. They need to
be aware of what we mean by the term “extremism” and the relationship between
extremism and terrorism’ whilst ‘also knowing what measures are available to
prevent people from being drawn into terrorism, and how to challenge the
extremist ideology that can be associated with it. They need to understand how
to obtain support for people who may be being exploited by radicalising influ-
ences’ (2015a, p. 4). Many teachers seek to counter extremist views and ideas in
schools as part of thoughtful educational practices that encourage critical think-
ing, but Prevent, as a counterterrorist strategy, only targets certain kinds of
extremist ideas. Fundamentalist and dogmatic positions, which eschew ‘funda-
mental British values’ but are not linked to terrorism even if they create, for
example, an atmosphere conducive to homophobia or sectarianism, would pre-
sumably not require action or referral under Prevent. Although the duty to
prevent terrorism is reasonable when a risk of imminent violence is suspected,
as is the case with school shootings, Prevent is not solely concerned with this
kind of immediate risk, or even with the expression of extremist views. Rather,
educators are being asked to identify and refer those students (and perhaps
colleagues) who are at risk of radicalisation (Knowles, 2012; Pilsner, 2013).
Yet, if it is the case, as Coolsaet argues, that the very notion of radicalisation is
‘ill-defined, complex and controversial’ (2008, p. 240), and if it is not clear what
is understood by ‘radicalisation’, let alone by ‘risk of radicalisation’, it is difficult
to see how that risk can be identified and managed by professionals, including
educators.
3. THE ‘RISK OF RADICALISATION’ AND THE CONCEPT OF THOUGHT-CRIME
Strategies that seek to embed counterterrorist strategies in educational institu-
tions, deploying preventative mechanisms and positioning them as sites of
surveillance in response to the so-called new terrorism, risk changing the nature
of educational relationships and the role of educational institutions, as I argue
through this essay. For example, the statutory duty of staff to report differences in
behaviour or visible appearance, a tendency toward isolation, a desire to belong
or an adventurous spirit, extends beyond pastoral care to counterterrorist inter-
vention in respect of monitoring students for indicators of radicalisation and
indicators that suggest that they may become radicalised. Policy documentation,
such as the guidelines for practitioners, implies that there is not only credibility,
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evidence and legitimacy for the models of risk management to be mobilised, but
also that clear and unambiguous indicators exist to identify the risk of radicalisa-
tion and that there is empirical evidence of effective interventions. In the broader
field of studies in counterterrorism, such certainty is not replicated (Kundnani,
2009, 2012; Schmid, 2013). Nonetheless, in the policy documentation, we find
statements such as, ‘[w]e believe that Prevent work to date has not clearly
recognised the way in which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use
of extremist ideas which as espoused and circulated by apparently non-violent
organisations, very often operating within the law. We will not change the law –
we remain committed to protecting the freedom of speech which many of these
extremists set out to undermine. But preventing radicalisation must mean chal-
lenging extremist ideas that are conducive to terrorism and also part of terrorist
narrative’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 12). In this respect, Prevent targets a
range of sectors ‘where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to
address’ (HM Government, 2011a, p. 10), and aims to reach the minority of
individuals ‘who are vulnerable to radicalisation’ (HM Government, 2011a, p.
62). Efforts to target those at ‘risk of radicalisation’ appear to rest upon three key
assumptions that are, in turn, related to pre-crime counterterrorist strategies: (i)
there are individuals who are vulnerable to certain kinds of ideas; (ii) these
individuals may not even know that they are on a pathway to terrorism; and (iii)
professionals can be trained to spot the signs that indicate someone is at risk of
radicalisation.
Despite an extensive literature challenging claims and policies that presup-
pose linear (and non-linear) relationships between radicalisation, extremism,
violent extremism and terrorism (Kundnani, 2006, 2012, 2014, 2015; Githens-
Mazer, 2012; Heath-Kelly, 2013; Horgan and Braddock, 2010; Richards, 2010;
Sedgwick, 2010), a strategy is being implemented in educational settings that
relies upon a progression model that itself rests upon on those very assumptions
and models that have been challenged by experts in the field. Empirical research
does not show a link between radicalisation and terrorism, or even between
extremism and violence or terrorism, and it also does not show a causal connec-
tion between theological persuasion and terrorism (Gearon, 2013; Horgan, 2005;
Kundnani, 2015; Spalek, 2011). It is also acknowledged that it is extremely
difficult to predict who will engage in terrorism (Horgan and Braddock, 2010). If
there are no clear indicators to identify those at the ‘risk of radicalisation’, no
agreed legal definitions of ‘radicalisation’ or extremism (Russell Group of
Universities, 2015), no clear correlation between radicalisation, extremism, vio-
lent extremism and terrorism, if the indicators outlined are so extensive as to
include large portions of the population, and if the idea that radicalisation leads
to terrorism has been significantly challenged, how can it be suggested teachers,
lecturers, early childhood care workers and so forth can, simply by observing the
ideas, dispositions, appearances and behaviours of those in their care, recognise
and objectively verify indicators that purportedly show someone to be ‘at risk of
radicalisation’?
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Such a student may not have had any thoughts of engagement with ‘extre-
mist’ or ‘radical’ ideas, or with ‘political violence’ and yet allegedly display
behaviours or express ideas that could suggest he or she is ‘at risk of radicalisa-
tion’. In the absence of either intention or action, this diagnosis is akin to what a
number of authors, citing Philip K. Dick (Kundnani, 2014; Martin, 2014;
McCulloch and Pickering, 2009), call ‘thought-crime’. If, (i) one does not and
cannot know whether or not one is committing an offence or whether one is on a
particular pathway because the concepts and thus the law are thinly and vaguely
defined; (ii) the specific claims about the stages to violent extremism and the
reasons why people engage in violent extremism and terrorism appear to be, as a
number of authors argue, founded on anecdote rather than evidence (Coolsaet,
2015; Horgan, 2005; Russell Group of Universities, 2015; Schmid, 2013); and
(iii) the criteria for assessment and risk management do not relate to risk, but
only potential risk, how can those preventative strategies now enforceable by law
in educational institutions and organisations be legitimated, justified or enacted?
What are the implications for the lives of students, young people and children
who may be targeted, or who feel themselves to be at risk of being targeted by
Prevent and Channel (the de-radicalisation multi-agency intervention programme
targeting children and young people) if the absence of intent or specific action
does not guarantee being found innocent?
4. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ‘VULNERABLE TERRORIST’
Increasingly, the counterterrorism and counter-radicalisation discourses of
Prevent and Channel focus upon the ‘vulnerable individual’. The language of
‘vulnerability’ and ‘resilience’ is commonplace in the therapeutic society and
‘therapeutic education’ (Ecclestone, 2012; Ecclestone and Hayes, 2008). When
dissent is pathologised and seen as a marker of an individual ‘vulnerable to
radicalisation’, this risks silencing students and precluding dialogue about diffi-
cult and complex ideas. If alienation, disaffection and estrangement are some of
the reasons that young people may turn to terrorism and violent extremism, it
would seem wiser that schools create the space for sensitive questioning and
exploration of issues affecting students’ lives. The way in which vulnerability is
conceptualised in the case of preventative counterterrorism is reminiscent of
colonial discourses about ‘infection’ and ‘contagion’ which served to ‘other’
and silence indigenous populations.
In counterterrorism discourses, the ‘vulnerable individual’ has become a
synonym for the (potentially) dangerous individual and the purpose of pro-
grammes such as Prevent and Channel is to preclude this pathway. The language
of vulnerability and resilience which permeates contemporary discourses about
the ‘new terrorism’ extends Foucault’s notions of pastoral power and bio-govern-
ance (2003, 2004, 2007), and brings discourses about well-being, safety and care
to bear on issues of (national) security. Whilst vulnerability is simply part of the
human condition (Butler, 2004), these discourses suggest that vulnerability can
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and should be overcome, and that life can be normalised through fostering
‘resilience’, in this case, to ideas of a particular kind. Vulnerability becomes a
problematic characteristic of a person’s identity that can be resolved through
expert support and intervention. Foucault (2004) showed how discourses of
purity and contagion informed nationalism, identitarian politics, racism and
fascism. The new variant of an old theme, common in colonial discourses,
now involves reading vulnerability through the lens of the concept of immunity,
or more precisely, lack of immunity or resilience in the face of radical or extreme
ideas.
Chief Constable Norman Bettison, leader of Prevent, said, ‘The “virus”
metaphor is particularly useful in thinking about strategies to target the most
susceptible and vulnerable in our communities [. . .] This sort of endeavour
will help us to provide barriers to infection’ (Bettison cited in Heath-Kelly,
2013, p. 401). The colonial legacies bound up in such terms are in part why
the use of such language in respect of Muslim communities is particularly
problematic. J.M. Coetzee’s remarks on apartheid thinking, censorship and
racial ecology are resonant with Bettison’s comments. He describes the
operation of metaphors of infection, contagion and the ‘germ of an idea’
saying ‘it is not the contagion that is suggestible but suggestibility itself:
being open to suggestion is what is suggestible [. . .] but it is only the already-
infected (already-agitated) who can be infected’ (1996, p. 182). The ‘risk of
radicalisation’ strategy plays on ideas of vulnerability and immunity in respect
of both the social body and the individual, and metaphors of infection and
contagion have performative rather than merely descriptive force. But as
Coetzee notes, mobilising ‘[c]ontagion as an explanatory model for the com-
munication of passions amongst the mass of people has often been used in the
past’ (1996, p. 180). Freud admired Le Bon’s study which named ‘suscept-
ibility to contagion, along with heightened suggestibility, and the lowering of
inhibitions against aggression, as the three main features of the psychology of
the crowd’ (1996, p. 180). Arguably, the attempt to locate sources of ‘infec-
tion’ in order to treat through early intervention and build resilience continues
the colonial metaphorical connections between censorship and contagion in
the attempt to identify those seen as vulnerable and thus dangerous for the
social body.
It is not only the individual who may be constituted as vulnerable, and hence
suspect, but also the wider community to which individuals belong. A number of
commentators (Bonino, 2013; Hickman et al., 2011; Kundnani, 2009; Pantazis
and Pemberton, 2009) have argued that Paddy Hillyard’s (1993) descriptions of
the lived experiences of Irish people in Northern Ireland and Britain at a time of
internment is resonant with the way that many Muslims feel that they are being
disproportionately targeted as a ‘suspect community’ by counterterrorism legis-
lation (Choudury and Fenwick, 2011; Spalek, 2011). Individuals and commu-
nities are simultaneously constituted as risky, requiring intervention, which leads
to the securitisation of community life, and also, by implication, potentially
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dangerous. The emphasis in Prevent on ‘non-violent extremism’ shifts the focus
from those likely to engage in terrorist violence to the ‘pool’, ‘sea’ or ‘oxygen’
that is the silent community that terrorists allegedly require to exist and persist.
The majority of referrals in the Channel programme are Muslim, and even
though 80% of referrals have been rejected since its introduction, students may
feel that voicing dissenting and critical ideas will lead them to be labelled ‘at risk
of radicalisation’. The person who becomes, or risks becoming, a terrorist is
constituted as a ‘vulnerable’ person requiring holistic and psychological inter-
vention. Perhaps this is not surprising given the therapeutic orientation of con-
temporary life, but it also serves as a de-legitimating and depoliticising strategy
that removes considerations of questions of injustice, politics and violence from
the public domain, replacing the language of ‘wrongs’ with that of ‘grievances’,
and centring analysis on the individual and their ‘subjective interpretations’,
rather than wider, contextual root causes and preconditions for violence, terror-
ism and war.
Let us reflect upon the implications of Prevent legislation in the context of
other offences, such as the Terrorism Act in the UK (2006) which made the
(undefined) ‘glorification’ and ‘encouragement’ of terrorism an offence (Bonino,
2013; Pantucci, 2010), and the new offence of public provocation in the Republic
of Ireland which states that ‘For the purposes of this Part, public provocation to
commit a terrorist offence means the intentional distribution, or otherwise mak-
ing available, by whatever means of communication by a person of a message to
the public, with the intent of encouraging, directly or indirectly (my italics), the
commission by a person of a terrorist activity’ (Criminal Justice (Terrorist
Offences) (Amendment) Act 2015, Section 4A). Consider the case of the
young boy who when asked during an art project to imagine an Ireland of the
future, says it could become smaller if England invaded, or bigger ‘if we got
back the six counties’, or that of a teenager in a youth project who graffitis ‘Up
the RA!’ (a slogan indicating support of the IRA) on a classroom wall. In the
latter case, upon following the direction of the tutor to find out who exactly the
‘RA’ were, he comes back furious because ‘they are taxing drug dealers!’, an
offence in which he had been dabbling. Would both of these cases be directed to
the Channel programme? What would be the implications for these children’s
future experiences of education, relationships with responsible adults and will-
ingness to dissent openly, even if the referral is rejected? Now that Prevent is a
statutory duty, it seems likely that referrals will increase, even if as a precau-
tionary measure.
5. THE ‘TERROR OF PREVENTION’
You can obstruct anything. And then there is the political risk thing. I think common
sense is needed. The problem is if you are too open and too liberal, the reaction is going
to be so extreme that it destroys everything. [. . .] You cannot allow the antagonism of
the public to completely destroy . . . so I think there is a certain amount of balance and
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judgement needed. So I think that I’d be one of those who would believe that prisoners
are entitled to a voice even though, and I said this time and again to the Provos [the
Provisional IRA], that I totally disagreed with what their philosophy was but I never
would say that you don’t have the right to have that philosophy.
Interview with Ex-Governor of Portlaoise Prison (O’Donnell, 2013)
It is the job of the writer, says Coetzee, to ‘destroy simplistic polarities and open
up complexities [. . .] but it is the nature of the state to gravitate toward homo-
geneity and impose homogeneous conformity on its citizens; the presence of a
sceptical diagnostic intelligence in the social body awakes its antagonism at an
almost instinctive level’ (1996, p. 209). The job of educational institutions ought
to be to create open spaces for dissent, listening and complexity, allowing for
ideas to be expressed, discussed, heard and examined. However, Prevent, along-
side the offences of indirect public provocation and glorification or encourage-
ment of terrorism, creates a situation for students and teachers akin to the
experience of ‘double consciousness’ described by Du Bois: one has to reflect
upon how one’s statements, comments, beliefs, views, behaviours and readings
might be interpreted by an unknown other who is positioned as expert, without
having full knowledge of the framework of or criteria guiding that other’s
interpretation. How can one then speak freely? J.M. Coetzee writing of censor-
ship and the paranoia that it generates, says that ‘the diffusion of paranoia is not
inadvertent; it is a technique of control’ (1996, p. 34). He quotes the Greek writer
George Mangakis saying, ‘ “The system is a diabolical voice for annihilating
your own soul. They want to make you see your thoughts through their eyes, and
control them yourself, through their point of view”. [. . .] The paranoia is there on
the inside, in their language, in their thinking, the rage one hears in Mangakis’s
words, the bafflement in Kis’, are rage and bafflement at the most intimate of
invasions, an invasion of very style of the self, by a contamination for which
there may be no cure’ (1996, p. 34). The destruction of trust between citizens is
damaging for any political system, and whilst the suspicion generated through
the implementation of Prevent may lead to a withdrawal from public life for
some, for others it may provoke paranoid self-doubt precipitated by the idea that
one may be punished or targeted for one’s beliefs and ideas, even those which
one did not know one had. This is corrosive for education, citizenship and
democracy, especially if one is uncertain about what one is permitted to say
or do.
Despite claims to promote critical inquiry and debate, the relatively empty
definition of extremism as that of ‘opposing fundamental British values’, com-
bined with the conflation of intelligence and evidence in the pre-crime agenda,
means it is not clear what one is permitted to say without being constituted as at
‘risk of radicalisation’ or as having ‘extremist’ ideas. It ought to be a matter of
real concern for democratic life and public life if students and fellow citizens
begin to self-censor in institutional settings for fear of being constituted as
‘vulnerable’ [to terrorism], doubting whether they can speak, viewing their
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own ideas through the lens of security agendas before weighing them up for
themselves.
It is not as simple as that, saying yes they should be allowed to appear in public or
express themselves . . . [Silence]. Yes, they should. I have not been asked to make
that argument before. Why should people be afraid of somebody’s freedom to
express themselves? Why are you afraid of what somebody has to say? If you think
they are a raving lunatic that nobody supports then why are you worried about what
they have to say? Why have they fear? What do they fear? Are they afraid that
everybody will want to go into jail? Or do they believe that giving people freedom
of expression that they are going to turn everybody else into a criminal? They don’t
have much faith in society and people’s values if that is the case. Yes. People
should have freedom of expression because what do people have to fear by
allowing them to express themselves and if when they express themselves they
are judged to be terrible and shocking and whatever, well people will be able to
judge that for themselves. It is like . . . don’t burn the books.
Interview with ex-Provisional IRA Prisoner and ex-Member of the Legislative
Assembly, Northern Ireland (MLA) (O’Donnell, 2013)
Reflecting on the words of the man above, an important issue for educators
seems to be to find ways of acknowledging the vulnerability and risk for students
in speaking freely in classrooms and institutional settings. The National Union of
Students (NUS) in the UK has launched a campaign called ‘Students not
Suspects’. The Universities and Colleges Union (UCU) states that Prevent will:
‘have a chilling effect upon debate and academic freedom within UK universities
and colleges; create an atmosphere of mistrust within institutions and between
staff and students which is at odds with academic values; create a legal duty upon
institutions and staff which is vague and not achievable’ (UCU, 2015). The
Russell Group of Universities released a statement which argued ‘[e]nabling free
debate within the law is a key function which universities perform in our
democratic society. Imposing restrictions on non-violent extremism or radical
views would risk limiting freedom of speech on campus and may potentially
drive those with radical views off campus and “underground”, where those views
cannot be challenged in an open environment. Closing down challenge and
debate could foster extremism and dissent within communities’ (Russell Group
of Universities, 2015, p. 3). It highlights the tension between the requirement by
law to ensure freedom of speech and the obligation under Prevent to address
non-violent extremism, the problematic issue of referral when no illegal activity
has taken place and the potential ramifications of the lack of clear definition of
broad terms like extremism, when universities risk exposure to legal challenge.
Vulnerability in relation to power means that one cannot always know if one
can speak freely so one has to be guaranteed that one will not be punished for so
doing. Foucault (2001, 2005) calls this fearless speech or parrhesia. He writes,
‘First, I think that these techniques manifest a very interesting and important shift
from that truth game which in the classical Greek conception of parrhesia was
constituted by the fact that someone was courageous enough to tell the truth to
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other people. For there is a shift from that kind of parrhesiastic game to another
truth game which now consists in being courageous enough to disclose the truth
about oneself’ (2001, p. 143). Educational spaces must allow students to speak
truthfully, having the courage to work through their views, and this political
practice of parrhesia that is one of contestation, reflection and enquiry also
brings with it the possibility of the second kind that is more closely linked to
one’s own transformation, the personal parrhesia of which Foucault speaks.
Having space and time to work through ideas, and allowing teachers and
lecturers the opportunity to explore difficult topics with children and students,
is part of holding open the unpredictable space of education. Rather than viewing
education’s role as an instrument to remedy society’s problems – in this case to
ensure national security – society is best served when educational institutions
remain more or less autonomous sites of enquiry, criticality, dissent, exploration,
reflection, enquiry and fearless speech, spaces in which students and educators
can trust one another. Coolsaet claims that, ‘[t]he foreign fighter phenomenon is
rooted in a specific youth subculture that has developed in reaction to an
environment young people feel and perceive as complex, demanding, unequal
and devoid of hope for improvement. It is not the result of a process of (political)
radicalisation, as is often touted by authorities. It is foremost an escape from their
estrangement from society and the apparent lack of empathy of society to their
situation’ (2015, p. 17). If this is the case, further alienating young people in
classrooms and lecture halls would seem to be both counterproductive and
unjust, serving only to compound marginalization and the sense of being
excluded from society. In this respect, there may be something to be learned
from educators who are accustomed to working in contexts with people who
have been imprisoned as ‘terrorists’ and who are often constituted as ‘violent
extremists’.
6. THE AUTONOMY OF EDUCATION
The NCAD review of Art in Portlaoise Prison involved interviews and the
descriptions of a range of stakeholders of the educational engagement of,
amongst others, prisoners aligned with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and
Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) who were housed in Portlaoise Prison
over a period of 26 years both before and after the Good Friday or Belfast
Agreement which led to a ceasefire, though not one agreed to by all parties.
Some of those interviewed in the Review were anti-Agreement former prisoners,
colloquially known as ‘dissident republicans’, from the Republic of Ireland. The
purpose of these reflections is to offer a lens with which we might critically
examine the potential implications of Prevent legislation in educational settings,
including schools in prisons, and to offer a different vision for education that
preserves its autonomy and the possibility of parrhesia.
One of the former prison officers describes the prison in the 1980s just prior
to the introduction of teachers,
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You have to get perspective, there was a full-scale war going on in the North,
irrespective of whether you call it the Troubles, and there was a threat of it spilling
over here, especially in ’81 with the H Blocks. And the government were really
trying to keep a lid on the whole thing, but what happened was we were used as the
battering rams with the ones [the political prisoners] they had. [. . .] Your life
outside was restricted because the temperature was very hot. Bloody Sunday had
ratcheted everything. We would have been seen as an aid to the British occupation
by a large portion of people down here. What saved us was that Portlaoise was the
prison town but it became very much an isolated group for self-protection.
Interview with ex-prison officer (O’Donnell, 2013)
Yet speaking of that time, a head teacher recalls,
I remember bringing a video of [the PE teacher] with these 20 big guys, all
terrorists in the English eyes, and there she was whipping them all, shouting at
them, roaring. Where are the officers? They couldn’t believe this. How come you
can justify your existence without trying to change these guys away from their
terrorism? This was in the middle of the 80s. What don’t you do something to stop
them? If any teacher tried that they’d stop coming.
Interview with Former Head Teacher in Prison (O’Donnell, 2013)
In the 1980s and into the 1990s when the officers felt that the conflict in
Northern Ireland risked spilling over into civil war in the Republic of Ireland,
teachers in prison were not asked to be the eyes and ears of the security
apparatus, were not asked to inform on their students and education was given
relative autonomy and the task of helping prisoners cope with their sentence.
Classes were, as they are now, attended in a voluntary capacity. Efforts were
made to engage the interests, expression and passions of the men by offering an
extensive and holistic curriculum that could, in the case of certain subject areas
such as art and creative writing, offer spaces for critical inquiry, collaborative
learning, imagination and self-determination. At a time of conflict, teachers
simply educated, and education was not made subordinate to security agendas,
even if it had to adapt to the specificity of the site of the prison.3
When formal education through external providers was introduced to the
prison in 1984, the prison authorities were initially concerned about the risk of
teachers being compromised, but as the civilian presence within the prison
became normalised, this concern dissipated. Despite a number of escape attempts
and a highly active and organised paramilitary organisation, it was not suggested
that education classes should (i) be used as a tool for de-radicalisation, counter-
radicalisation or reform, or (ii) that teachers should either involve themselves in
surveillance upon or inform on their students in prison, even after the presence of
prison officers in the space of the classroom was removed. The Head Teacher
(above) was not altogether surprised that in the eyes of his international collea-
gues, the PE teacher’s existence could only be justified were she to be seen
‘rehabilitating’ her ‘terrorist’ students, but, as he remarks, they simply would not
have come to class were she to have attempted to do so. He understood that if
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one tries to manipulate one’s students toward non-educational ends that they
have not chosen, they will resist. Even during this extremely difficult period, the
parameters and autonomy of education remained circumscribed, and the integrity
of the educational endeavour remained protected.4
7. PERSISTING WITH IMPOSSIBLE CONVERSATIONS
For nearly five years, I taught philosophy classes to Republican prisoners who
live on different landings in a block designated for political prisoners (or sub-
versives in the language of Irish Prison Service) in a high-security prison.
Educators cannot, as a rule, pick and choose their students, and students come
to class on a voluntary basis. The men can, as one said, ‘smell’ it off you if the
teacher does not want to be there. In a total institution, impositions of further
control and authority are not welcomed. It is better when an educator can
cultivate a renunciative ethic of creative attention as this makes space for each
other, whilst allowing for the integrity of all parties to be sustained. I was aware
that some of the men were initially sceptical and suspicious of my motivations
given my background as an academic. Trust is essential in pedagogical relation-
ships, in particular in the prison (Reuss, 2000) and when one is a new outsider,
one’s agenda can be called into question so one must address these issues and
have patience in building trust. As educators we accept everyone who is in our
classroom (Buber, 1947), which does not mean agreeing with them. In the
prison, as in other settings, if one tries to position education within a behavioural
change framework that explicitly aims to change behaviour and beliefs, students
will not engage, or will not do honestly. On political landings, they simply would
not come, as such an approach fails to respect their integrity as ‘other’ and as
student, viewing them instead as an ‘object’ to be changed. Even if prisons and
other institutions wish to engage in the behavioural change of students, such
projects should not involve educators.
At the beginning of my classes in prison, I say that I have three ‘rules’ for
philosophy. The first is that we should and will disagree with one another, and
dissent is to be valued. The second is that I am not trying to change anyone, and
whatever transformation takes place should be on the person’s own terms, in
their own time and in their own way. The third is that we adopt a principle of
critical generosity in relation to authors and to one’s peers, and create together
the conditions that will allow each of us to speak freely. I outline some of the
relational qualities that students will need to cultivate if they are to engage
wholeheartedly with philosophy, and indeed study more broadly. These include
open-mindedness, questioning oneself and others, welcoming other perspectives,
releasing one’s imagination, exploring one’s values, having patience, tolerating
boredom, sitting with ideas, being humble, cultivating courage, confidence and
voice and remaining attuned to the ethical commitment to valuing the other as
other.
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I want to communicate the delicate nature of these relationships, in part to
show how difficult it is to develop them and how easy it is to damage them.
Writing of her experiences of working in Maghaberry, a high-security prison in
Antrim, Northern Ireland, Tracy Irwin (2008) pointed to the importance of
ordinary forms of conviviality like sharing a cup of tea and biscuits, and the
ways in which educational spaces can allow people to tell their own stories. The
ethic of hospitality and welcome created by the men in the prison has allowed for
the quality of openness to pervade the lived space of our philosophy classes on
political landings in the prison. This comes from small gestures like making
coffee or tea or even sharing cake, fruit and chocolate. These ritualised elements
of the ‘invisible’ and ‘intangible’ serve to create atmospheres that invite and
sustain philosophical conversations. Care is taken by all parties to ensure that
boundaries are respected, and there are implicit parameters in terms of topics of
discussion. For example, I won’t discuss or analyse individual cases or trials, and
seldom have I been asked to. We do, however, talk about contemporary legisla-
tion and philosophy in relation to the law. We might examine Giorgio Agamben
or Chantal Mouffe’s writings on Carl Schmitt, including the way in which the
sovereign suspends the law, and its relation to ‘states of emergency’ or ‘states of
exception’, or I could introduce Judith Butler’s meditations post 9/11 on precar-
ious life or frameworks of war which ask questions like ‘whose life is grievable’?
and ‘how can we respond to violence?’ When reflecting upon both what I will
teach and how, I ask myself whether I have or could have studied or taught this
material outside the prison, and if the answer is affirmative, then under the
principle of normalisation, I can stand over my teaching and curriculum in the
prison. Whilst Irwin emphasises the more intimate dimensions of disclosure in
pedagogical settings, and such stories are part of what it means to do philosophy
if it to be meaningful for students, I am more interested in the potential offered
by education for critical inquiry, reflection, dissent and parrhesia (or fearless
speech). Preserving the integrity of education spaces by understanding them as
proto-public spaces also communicates the way in which the integrity of public
institutions, including educational institutions, is valued, and serves to support
the conditions for citizenship and real participation of students. Educational
spaces must be driven by a finely attenuated sense of our moral equality as
human beings and our political equality as citizens.
Much has been written on students and researchers in terms of the implica-
tions of de-radicalisation and counterterrorism strategies, including the impor-
tance of academic freedom; however, insufficient attention has been paid to way
that teachers must also feel that they can speak freely and honestly, and the
important role that students have in creating the relational space that makes this
possible. Whilst the parameters of the educational space in the prison are not
stated, they are observed, and these parameters matter. It is important that the
teacher or student in prison is not put in a compromised position, so we don’t
discuss the details of the organisations of which they are members, or are
accused of so being. We don’t discuss anything related to operational issues, or
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anything that might be incriminating of themselves or others. We don’t discuss
names, we don’t discuss actions, I don’t liaise between people who are outside
and those inside and so forth. I have been asked, out of curiosity more than
anything, whether I had ever been approached by the security forces, and if I
were to be so approached, what I would do. I initially said that I would find it
impossible to maintain my integrity as an educator were I to be approached in
such a fashion, but on reflection I felt I would have to stand over the integrity of
what I do and call such extra-educational agencies to account. It is, however, a
moot point, since I have never been asked to inform on or survey my students, to
explain or justify my curriculum, or to censor my engagement in any way. There
would be real implications if the duty to report those at ‘risk of radicalisation’
were implemented, in particular in a prison, as it undermines the student–teacher
relationship, and risks teachers being viewed as ‘informants’.
My students and I are aware that our classes may be recorded but I cannot
know whether this is the case. There is, of course, a significant difference
between intelligence agencies or the prison service recording classes, troubling
as that would be in my view, and me secretly recording my classes or sharing my
observations with others in the interests of intelligence gathering or risk assess-
ment. In the latter case, this would undermine trust. Teachers have a duty of
pastoral care for their students in prison, as in any other institution, but the only
circumstance in which teachers should have an obligation to inform on, or report,
their students to the relevant authorities should be in the case of concern about
imminent and specific threats of violence to or by that student, and educational
institutions have developed reasonable and measured risk management and risk
assessment approaches that support this (Gereluk, 2015).
An educator who wishes to create a space for critical enquiry and questioning
is in a precarious position in the current climate. The position of educators and
researchers who work with people convicted or charged with offences against the
State, people who are, in the eyes of the State, already ‘extremists’, ‘terrorists’ or
‘radicalised’, is a particularly complex one. As it stands, Section 4A of the
Amended Criminal Justice Bill (2015) in the Republic of Ireland may have
implications for teaching philosophy to political prisoners. Again, it states, ‘For
the purposes of this Part, public provocation to commit a terrorist offence means
the intentional distribution, or otherwise making available, by whatever means of
communication by a person of a message to the public, with the intent of
encouraging, directly or indirectly, the commission by a person of a terrorist
activity (my italics)’. In the case of indirect public provocation, intent is rendered
ambiguous and provocation is vague – the question of direct public incitement of
an act of terror is entirely another matter and would require appropriate
intervention.
What constitutes provocation? What constitutes indirect provocation? Could
I, as a teacher of political prisoners, or even of students who subsequently
become, or who are without my knowledge, committed to political violence,
be charged with indirect provocation if, unwittingly, I bring a text or discuss an
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idea that a student subsequently mobilises to explain his or her support of, and
even engagement in, terrorist or violent activity? What ideas and texts can I then
safely bring into the space of the prison or the classroom? Might reading
Socrates, Frantz Fanon, Angela Davis, Daniel Graeber or Karl Marx generate
ideas that might lead someone to join a proscribed organisation? Could the mere
possession of articles (Virgo, 2008) such as films or philosophy books constitute
grounds for prosecution? Pedagogically, must I steer clear of rhetorical or
polemical positions, or avoid outlining counterarguments for fear they might
be interpreted as advocating a particular position? Should I review all my
philosophical content to assess whether any of it might contribute to the ‘risk
of radicalisation’ of my students, for instance, in the sense of fostering dissatis-
faction with the status quo or providing arguments for the right of the people to
resist the State, but then what content in political philosophy can I address? In
the case of Prevent, what does it mean to teach ‘fundamental British values’?
What of the Levellers or the Diggers? Hobbes, Spinoza or Locke? Anarchists
like Graeber, Goldman or Kropotkin who challenge democracy, or even Badiou,
Zizek or Negri? What about feminist philosophers who seek to transform exist-
ing institutions? Or Charles Taylor, Will Kymlika and other communitarian
thinkers who challenge the presuppositions of liberalism? Should I continue to
encourage my students to think for themselves, to develop arguments for their
positions, to engage with the perspectives of others and to dissent?
The curricular and pedagogical elements of Prevent and the Learning
Together to be Safe toolkit suggest that that one ought to adopt an approach
that encourages free speech. Yet, the broader framing and the lived experience
of those who feel themselves to be members of the new ‘suspect community’,
combined with the introduction of expert pastoral discourses that use the
language of ‘resilience’ and ‘vulnerability’, have tended to individualise and
psychologise issues such as conflict, dissent and war (Heath-Kelly, 2012,
2013; Martin, 2014), making it difficult to know what one is permitted to
say and discuss. Under such circumstances, it becomes difficult to persuade
students that they can speak freely and openly, especially if they are challen-
ging the State, including State violence, or are committed to radical, and even
extreme, positions, be they theological, philosophical or political. This is why
trust and parrhesia matter.
Speaking of the work he had made with his teacher and film-maker, Jonathan
Cummins (2009), one man who had been imprisoned as an anti-Agreement IRA
prisoner reflects on the process of pedagogical and creative engagement, saying,
That is as much I want to say about that for now. See the machoism of going to
prison. You know what you are and your politics. It is not about machoism, but if I
was a nipper, a young buck, I became a poor republican in jail. Coming through
that and learning, speaking about myself, and getting stuff sometimes dragged out
of me or pulled out of me which was a good process for me. Going back to my cell
and saying I didn’t really tell him that, you fool . . . You know, literally talking to
myself in the cell. For me, it was very cathartic. It just happened for me at the right
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time. [. . .] Talking about putting stuff on video. See you put a man there and say do
you want to tell your story. See, it is not a propaganda exercise. It is not about the
struggle. It is your story and how it affects you. You can say anything you want.
There are no absolutes. Just say whatever you need to say. I can look back on my
stuff. I made stuff for me kids to look back on, how I felt and what I wanted to say
when I was living it and when I really felt it to get that across. Instead of sitting on
a bar stool twenty-five years later making up stuff that I didn’t really . . . shielding
stuff from them, or embellishing. It is the cold hard, well not hard, but it is how I
felt about certain things and to put that down on video. It wouldn’t have been
possible to write a letter or a diary or a book or whatever. It is the visual.
This kind of honest and intimate disclosure from men involved in ‘dissident
republicanism’ is unusual. Cummins’ films were made possible by a pedagogical
relationship that lasted many years of working together as teacher and student. In
interview, all the men from this organisation speak of the trust that they had in
Cummins and of how essential it was for them.
Whilst I acknowledge that the Republic of Ireland is a different jurisdiction
with different historical, educational and social legacies and traditions, my
purpose in presenting learning from teaching and research in this context is to
argue that education, both within the prison and in educational institutions
throughout society, must preserve a space in which critical inquiry is welcomed
and both students and teachers feel free to speak. Such a space must welcome
robust debate, silences and students’ efforts to stumble their way around ideas.
Relational qualities that students come to embody if they engage seriously in the
study of subjects like philosophy, or if they develop a practice in film-making,
include open-mindedness, ethical imagination, attunement to human fallibility
(including their own), a willingness to develop a deeper understanding of subject
matter and a desire to explore a range of possibilities for expressing and explor-
ing their thoughts and ideas. Given these requirements, the presence of the
extremist student who adopts a position that is dogmatic, fundamentalist and
narrow-minded, displaying a lack of empathy for the disciplines and traditions of
others and unwillingness to listen or admit the possibility of his or her own
fallibility, is destructive of the educational space. It matters little whether this be
for it religious, atheistic, racist, sexist, political or philosophical reasons, an
extremist in the classroom makes the pedagogical space near impossible; there
is no ‘other’ for the extremist. As such, education in its very practice and
principles must be anti-extremist, just as genuine education must resist tempta-
tions to indoctrinate students or form their characters directly. It is important to
remember that even though extremism poses significant pedagogical obstacles,
this does not necessarily mean that the extremist is, or will be, violent. It is, thus,
questionable whether it is appropriate to mobilise interventions in educational
settings in order to combat extremism under counterterrorist legislation.
The Learning Together to be Safe toolkit seems to suggest that all terrorists
are extremists; however, in my experience of teaching Republican prisoners, my
students are not, at least in the context of our classes, dogmatic, unreflective,
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fanatical, and nor do they hold to fixed ideas. Whilst many understand them-
selves be radical, their view is that they are not extremists. If they are convicted
members of paramilitary organisations (rather than being on remand), they are
committed to what is called ‘physical force republicanism’ which sanctions the
use of political violence, although there will be disagreement in respect of the
form that this should take. Many, though not all, have been convicted on
membership or conspiracy charges rather than for specific acts of violence. We
have had robust philosophical discussions about the question of political violence
in classes, and I speak frankly and argue my position in relation to this question,
as do they. I encourage striving to understand a question from multiple perspec-
tives, including perspectives opposite to that which one holds. In classes there is
agreement on some issues and disagreement on others, but we remain committed
to continuing our conversation, despite considerable disagreement on certain
issues. They are not a monolithic group, and some also express positions against
the use of violence. Some students simply come to class to encounter new ideas
and thinkers. Some say that they welcome philosophy classes precisely because
the experience of philosophical inquiry and conversation stems tendencies
toward dogmatism and a superficial understanding of ideas and ideologies,
broadening their horizons, and opening them to thinking and questioning. In
turn, I have never felt silenced or felt unable to speak freely. Seeking to directly
change the behaviour and beliefs of any student would corrode the pedagogical
space and our relationships. Attempts to subordinate education to other agendas,
such as counterterrorism, would be viewed as coercive and lead to the disen-
gagement of my students. To learn and to educate, one must listen, question and
find ways of encountering the other in an ethic of dialogue. I agree with Hanan
Alexander when he writes that ‘real conversation is possible only if we are
willing to be influenced by the other’ (Alexander, 2003, p. 235). As a teacher,
these classes have changed me, deepening my understanding of central philoso-
phical questions, and I can no longer look at the world as I did before.
8. CONCLUSION
It is important to preserve education’s autonomy from security agendas, not only
because of the difficulties with the concept of radicalisation, or because dis-
courses of vulnerability and victimhood risk pathologising dissenting students,
but also because, as Martin Buber describes rather well, ‘[a]s soon as my pupils
notice that I want to educate their characters I am resisted precisely by those who
show most signs of genuinely independent character; they will not let themselves
be educated, or rather, they do not like the idea that somebody wants to educate
them’ (Buber, 1947, p. 133). However, there is a deeper reason which is the
importance of separating education from indoctrination or manipulation, and
creating an open space for the pedagogical encounter. Education is not a space
of absolute control. It has to permit of unpredictability and surprise both in terms
of student’s response and the way in which he or she may be transformed
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through the encounter with a subject and the perspectives of others, including
those of the teacher. As one former IRA prisoner said,
Firstly, even to have somebody learn, you first have to make a connection with that
person and you have to have a relationship. And it is personal how that works,
particularly with people in jails. That if the personal connection is made, the
academic part, the knowledge that is being imparted is secondary. There is a
trust. You are insisting you are coming from the authority side, and it is a very
polarised side, so you are coming from that system. In order to gain that trust and
for them to open to you, in order that they will learn, then they must feel that you
are on their side almost, without compromising yourself. If I were in the position of
an educationalist then I would spend a lot of time around that, and continue to
spend a lot of time around that. It is only at a certain point that people are open to
possibilities from you, when you have gained that trust.
Interview with ex-Provisional IRA Prisoner (O’Donnell, 2013).
If educators seek to explicitly and directly change the world view of their
students, encouraging them to adopt a different world view, be it prescribed by
the teacher, police, security forces or the State, it seems to me that most students
will resist and resent such efforts, even if they appear to comply. Transformation
ought rather to be in the sense of trying to create the conditions for the world to
open for a student (Maldiney, 1991). To strive to impose a position damages both
the delicate trust that can come to exist between student and teacher, and
possibilities for creativity and autonomy in respect of subject matter. If education
is not seen as a space that invites open dialogue and free speech, students will not
engage and they will not open up to the kinds of transformation and questioning
that the pedagogical encounter can bring in its wake.
To learn involves trust. It means opening oneself to the other, recognising
one’s own fallibility and vulnerability, and even, as Hanan Alexander (2015) has
said, the possibility that one is wrong. It demands humility on the part of both
teacher and student. One must be able to listen to and reflect upon ideas and
questions from the perspective of the other, even if one returns to one’s original
position. Proper educational spaces ensure that ideas can be discussed safely,
however problematic those ideas may be. Being fearful of being referred under
Prevent or other counterterrorist legislation militates against this ethic; even
‘anti-extremist’ education’ already positions education as subordinate to an
extrinsic agenda. Instead, we should think about cultivating rich practices of
education that can open up critical inquiry, sensitive engagement, deep under-
standing of subject matter, a sense of passion and curiosity and allow for diverse
modalities of expression. This kind of practice of education, by its nature,
requires that students stem or suspend extremist or ideological positions, at
least in class, and that they question and exercise parrhesia, moving their
imaginations into the worlds and ideas of others, even the worlds of those with
whom they profoundly disagree. It is this kind of an approach to education that
ought to be cultivated in educational institutions, an approach that allows for
minds to be opened rather than formed. Only by preserving education’s
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autonomy from security agendas, can pedagogical spaces and pedagogical
encounters convince all parties that they can speak freely and that relations of
trust will be valued and respected. Students can then allow themselves to be
opened up to being transformed and moved by their encounters with ideas and
through dialogue with the others who share their classroom.
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10. NOTES
1 The Offences against the State Acts 1939–1998 constitute the main body of counter-
terrorism legislation aimed at domestic terrorism in the Republic of Ireland. The
Criminal Justice (Terrorist Offences) Act 2005 is directed toward international terror-
ism and also amends the Offences against the State Acts. There was a further
Amendment to Section 4 of the 2005 Act with the Criminal Justice (Terrorist
Offences) (Amendment) Act 2015, which now includes three new offences of public
provocation to commit a terrorist offence, recruitment for terrorism and training for
terrorism.
2 This programme had been funded directly by the Department of Justice, and the
review was commissioned by the NCAD as a legacy review to capture the knowledge
and learning from the programme. The purpose of the programme was to introduce
students in prison to the experience of a third-level approach to art by practising artists.
3 Whilst the NCAD programme was funded by the Department of Justice and was rolled
out under the aegis of the Irish Prison Service, there was no interference in the
programme by these bodies. Teachers are not required to sign the Official Secrets
Act, although prison officers are required to do so.
4 Education in prison in the Republic of Ireland is mainly provided by the local
Education and Training Board (ETB), previously known as the Vocational Education
Committee, which offers the same courses as are offered by the ETB in the wider
community. ETBs are autonomous of the Irish Prison Service and are funded by
the Department of Education and Skills. Third-level provision is primarily provided
by the Open University. Prisoners attend classes in a voluntary capacity. In the UK, on
the other hand, whilst students in prison also access third-level education through the
Open University, prisons put out tenders for prison education provision and prison
education is coordinated by the Offenders’ Learning and Skills Service (OLASS) in
partnership with the Department for Education and Skills (now Department for
Children, Schools and Families), and the Prison Service. Contracted providers are
paid by results which can create greater instability and turnover of staff. A number of
other organisations and institutions are also involved in educational projects and
‘offender learning’ in the UK is part of the strategy of reducing reoffending.
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